

## Lecture 7: Minimax Theorem and Duality

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## 7.1 Game Theory and Minimax Theorem

To recap, we introduced the case of a zero-sum, one-shot, two player matrix game. The game is described by the payoff matrix  $M$ , whose element  $m_{ij}$  denotes the value player A sends to player B when actions  $i$  and  $j$  are chosen respectively.

Today, we continue our discussion on the result of such games,

### 7.1.1 Pure Strategy

When executing a **pure strategy**, a player only makes deterministic choices. Here's how such a game would unfold:

1. Alice chooses a row  $i$ .
2. Bob, after observing Alice's strategy (in this case, row  $i$ ), chooses a column  $j$ .
3. Alice pays  $M_{ij}$  to Bob.

Since we assume both players are rational agents, the result is simple:

- When Alice goes first,  $\min_i \max_j M_{ij}$  is payed.
- When Bob goes first,  $\max_j \min_i M_{ij}$  is payed.

It can be proved that the second player always have the upper hand. In mathematical terms,

$$\min_i \max_j M_{ij} \geq \max_j \min_i M_{ij}$$

### 7.1.2 Mixed Strategy

A **mixed strategy** can be viewed as a probabilistic combination of pure strategies. A mixed strategy game would proceed as follows:

1. Alice chooses a probability distribution  $p$  over the rows.

2. Bob, after observing Alice's strategy (i.e.  $p$ ), chooses probability distribution  $q$  over the columns.
3. Alice pays Bob  $p^\top Mq$ .

Since the choices are probabilistic,  $p^\top Mq$  is the expectation of final results. Again, assuming Alice and Bob are rational, we get:

- When Alice goes first, an expected  $\min_p \max_q p^\top Mq$  is payed.
- When Bob goes first, an expected  $\max_q \min_p p^\top Mq$  is payed.

Note that  $p, q$  cannot be any arbitrary vector, but are rather probability vectors with non-negative entries that add up to one.

The eminent question is: what's the relationship between these values? Does the second player still hold an advantage? John von Neumann answered this in his 1928 paper [VN28].

### Theorem 7.1 (John von Neumann Minimax Theorem)

1.  $\min_p \max_q p^\top Mq = \max_q \min_p p^\top Mq$
2. Equivalently,  $\exists(p^*, q^*)$  s.t.  $\forall p, q, p^* Mq \leq p^* Mq^* \leq pMq^*$ , and  $(p^*, q^*)$  is the equilibrium.

The original proof was given via a generalization of the Brouwer fixed-point theorem. Although topology is beyond the scope of this course, a proof using ML theory will be given in future lectures.

We also consider a generalization of this theorem, given by Maurice Sion [S58], which would soon come in handy in our following discussion on Lagrange duality.

### Theorem 7.2 (Sion's Minimax Theorem)

Let  $f(x, y)$  be a function. If for any fixed  $y$ ,  $f(x, y)$  is convex in  $x$ , and for any fixed  $x$ ,  $f(x, y)$  is concave in  $y$ , Then:

1.  $\min_x \max_y f(x, y) = \max_y \min_x f(x, y)$
2.  $\exists(x^*, y^*)$  s.t.  $\forall x, y, f(x^*, y) \leq f(x^*, y^*) \leq f(x, y^*)$

## 7.2 Lagrange Duality

In optimization, **duality** allows optimization problems to be viewed from two perspectives: the primal form and the dual form. Adopting the dual form allows for new insight, while often preserving the optimal value.

Let's consider the following **primal** optimization problem:

$$(P) \quad \begin{array}{ll} \min_x & f(x) \\ \text{s.t.} & g_i(x) \leq 0, \quad i \in [m] \\ & h_i(x) = 0, \quad i \in [n]. \end{array}$$

Where  $f$  and  $g_i$ 's are convex functions, and  $h_i$ 's are linear. The  $P$  here denotes primal form.

We now transform this problem to its dual form.

**Step 1.** It can be shown that the following optimization problem is equivalent to the primal problem,

$$\min_x \max_{\lambda, \mu} f(x) + \sum_{i=1}^m \lambda_i g_i(x) + \sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i h_i(x)$$

$$s.t. \lambda \geq 0$$

as when one of the constraints is not satisfied, the corresponding  $\lambda_i$  or  $\mu_i$  can make the function value arbitrarily large. We call this new objective function the **Lagrange function**, denoted as  $L(x; \lambda, \mu)$ .

$$L(x; \lambda, \mu) := f(x) + \sum_{i=1}^m \lambda_i g_i(x) + \sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i h_i(x)$$

**Step 2.** We now apply the Sion's Minimax Theorem on this min-max optimization problem. The theorem constraints are satisfied ( $L(x; \lambda_0, \mu_0)$  is the non-negative weighted sum of convex functions;  $L(x_0; \lambda, \mu)$  is linear, therefore concave in  $\lambda, \mu$ ). Thus

$$\min_x \max_{\lambda, \mu: \lambda \geq 0} L(x; \lambda, \mu) = \max_{\lambda, \mu: \lambda \geq 0} \min_x L(x; \lambda, \mu)$$

Combining steps 1 and 2, we now consider the problem  $\max_{\lambda, \mu: \lambda \geq 0} \min_x L(x; \lambda, \mu)$ . Solving  $\nabla_x L(x; \lambda, \mu) = 0$ , we get  $x^* = \varphi(\lambda, \mu)$ .

**Step 3.** Substituting  $x$  with  $\varphi(\lambda, \mu)$ , we get the dual problem:

$$(D) \quad \max_{\lambda, \mu} f(\varphi(\lambda, \mu)) + \sum_{i=1}^m \lambda_i g_i(\varphi(\lambda, \mu)) + \sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i h_i(\varphi(\lambda, \mu))$$

$$s.t. \lambda \geq 0$$

### 7.3 Example: Optimal Margin Classifier

Previously, we posed the optimization problem for finding the optimal margin classifier:

$$(P) \quad \min_{w, b} \frac{1}{2} \|w\|_2^2$$

$$s.t. \quad y_i(w^T x_i + b) \geq 1, \forall i \in [n],$$

We now develop its dual form. The problem can be rewritten as:

$$\max_{\lambda} \min_{w, b} \frac{1}{2} \|w\|_2^2 + \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i (1 - y_i(w^T x_i + b))$$

$$s.t. \lambda \geq 0$$

Setting the derivative of  $L$  with respect to  $w, b$  to zero, we get

$$w = \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i y_i x_i$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i y_i = 0$$

Plugging this back to the Lagrangian function, we get the dual form

$$(D) \quad \min_{\lambda} \frac{1}{2} \sum_i \sum_j \lambda_i \lambda_j y_i y_j x_i^\top x_j - \sum_i \lambda_i$$
$$s.t. \lambda_i \geq 0, \quad i \in [n]$$
$$\sum_i \lambda_i y_i = 0$$

Note that the dual problem is still a quadratic programming problem: the first term is a quadratic form derived from a Gram matrix, which is positive-semidefinite.

## References

- [VN28] J. v. NEUMANN, Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. *Math. Ann.* **100** , 295–320 (1928).  
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