

## Lecture 6: Learning Algorithms

Lecturer: Liwei Wang Scribe: Yizao Tang, Tianyi Wu, Zhaoji Zhang, Zirui Zhou, Suhan Ling, Yanzhe Wang

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## 6.1 Recap : VC Theory

VC Theory is data independent & algorithm independent, and only model dependent.  $P_D(Y \neq f(X)) \leq P_S(Y \neq f(X)) + O\left(\sqrt{\frac{d \ln n + \ln \frac{1}{\delta}}{n}}\right)$  for  $d = \text{VCD}(F)$ . When  $d > n$ , we called the model **overparametrization**, then we can't use VC Theory to analysis generalization. In deep learning,  $d$  is often greater than the number of parameters, so overparametrization often occurs in large model. It shows that the algorithm is important as well.

## 6.2 Linear Classification

Given training data set  $(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_n, y_n)$ ,  $x_i \in \mathbf{R}^d$ ,  $y_i \in \{\pm 1\}$ . Design an efficient algorithm to tell if the training data are linear separable.  $\mathcal{F} = \{\text{sgn}(w^T x + b) : w \in \mathbf{R}^d, b \in \mathbf{R}\}$ . We can use linear programming to solve it.

When the solution is not unique, we try to find the "best" separating line. We define the **margin** be the minimal distance between every point to the separating line, and we also want to maximize the margin, called **max margin classifier**. Formally, we want to maximize  $\min_i \{y_i(w^T x_i + b)\}$ ,  $\|w\|_2 = 1$ . We write it down in the form of programming:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{w, b, t} \quad t \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & y_i(w^T x_i + b) \geq t, \forall i \in [n] \\ & \|w\|_2 = 1 \end{aligned}$$

The  $t$  here is called a **slack**.  $t > 0$  indicates that the data set is separable.

Now we need to introduce the Convex Optimization Problem, which also have known efficient algorithm:

$$\begin{aligned} & \min_x \quad f(x) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & g(x) \leq 0 \\ & h(x) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

where  $f$  is convex function, and  $g, h$  is linear function.

If we only concern the  $\frac{w}{\|w\|_2}$  and  $b$ , we could rewrite it in the form of quadratic programming and transform our problem into Convex Optimization Problem, which is:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{w,b} \quad & \frac{1}{2} \|w\|_2^2 \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & y_i(w^T x_i + b) \geq 1, \forall i \in [n] \end{aligned}$$

Homework 1: Prove they have the same solution.

## 6.3 Minmax Theory and Duality

### 6.3.1 Maxtrix Game, two player, Zero Sum Game, one-shot

Zero Sum Game : the sum of the profit of Alice and Bob is zero.

one-shot : only play once.

for this kind of game, we could write a payoff matrix M

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Bob} \quad 1 \quad \dots \quad j \quad \dots \quad n \\ \text{Alice} \\ 1 \quad \left( \begin{array}{cccccc} (a_1, b_1) & \dots & (a_1, b_j) & \dots & (a_1, b_n) \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ i & (a_i, b_1) & \dots & (a_i, b_j) & \dots & (a_i, b_n) \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ m & (a_m, b_1) & \dots & (a_m, b_j) & \dots & (a_m, b_n) \end{array} \right) \end{array}$$

The Cell  $(a_i, b_j)$  describes the reward of Alice and Bob when they choose the action  $i$  and  $j$ . If we substitute the  $(a_i, b_j)$  as  $m_{i,j}$ , we have

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Bob} \quad 1 \quad \dots \quad j \quad \dots \quad n \\ \text{Alice} \\ 1 \quad \left( \begin{array}{cccccc} m_{1,1} & \dots & m_{1,j} & \dots & m_{1,n} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ i & m_{i,1} & \dots & m_{i,j} & \dots & m_{i,n} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ m & m_{m,1} & \dots & m_{m,j} & \dots & m_{m,n} \end{array} \right) \end{array}$$

Let  $M$  be the payoff matrix. Then we describe the (Pure Strategy) matrix game:

1. Alice chooses a row  $i$  in  $M$
2. Bob chooses a column  $j$  after observing Alice's action
3. Alice pays  $m_{i,j}$  to Bob

As everyone tries to maximize his profit, Alice actually pays

$$A = \min_i \{ \max_j \{ m_{i,j} \} \}$$

When Bob moves first, Alice choose a row after Bob's action, Alice actually pays

$$B = \max_j \{ \min_i \{ m_{i,j} \} \}$$

Then we always have  $A \geq B$ , the player moves last has the advantage.

Homework 2: Prove that A and B have a certain Ordered Relation that  $A \geq B$ .